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CHINA AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
Lieutenant Colonel Philippe D. Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps
China comes to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for
natural resources but also with the financial resources and political
influence to pursue its objectives vigorously. China has altered the stra-
tegic context in Africa.
ANTHONY LAKE, MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM
In February 2007, President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China com-pleted a much-publicized visit to Africa. The trip fulfilled a promise made at an
Africa-China summit in Beijing in November 2006, where forty-eight African
heads of state heard him pledge to double aid to Africa by 2009 and create an in-
vestment fund of five billion dollars over the next three years. This 2007 tour—
which included Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Mo-
zambique, and the Seychelles—was the third such high-visibility visit to Africa
President Hu has made since 2000, and it reflects China’s growing interest and
influence in that continent.1
Indeed, China has developed for Africa a comprehensive strategy reflecting
its own wide-ranging economic, diplomatic, political, and military engagement
there. Beijing’s burgeoning presence in Africa has
been fueled by a combination of its own economic
growth, its need for resources, more sophisticated
leadership, better scholarship on Africa, and a domes-
tic public more confident in China as a global actor.2
Additionally, China has notably enhanced its inter-
national standing with a dramatic increase in par-
ticipation in United Nations peacekeeping missions
from Haiti to East Timor, and as part of this larger
engagement it has become a significant contributor
to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. This peace-
keeping presence represents just one, but nevertheless
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important, facet of growing Chinese influence in Africa, which needs to be un-
derstood and appreciated by American policy makers.
CHINA’S RISING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA
China’s pervasive influence in Africa is manifest not only in its burgeoning eco-
nomic trade with the continent, forecast to surpass $100 billion by 2010, but
in its energy strategy, its diplomatic presence, its cultural exchanges, and its
growing military presence and security cooperation.3 Over seven hundred Chi-
nese companies operate in forty-nine African countries, in markets ranging
from textiles to fishing to extractive industries.4 It has established seven regional
trade and investment centers throughout Africa to seek new economic and
infrastructure-development opportunities.5 China, currently the world’s second-
largest net importer of oil, imports from Africa 25 percent of its oil (forecast to
increase to 40 percent within the next decade).6 Not only President Hu but other
top Chinese leaders have visited Africa extensively since 2000, and Chinese dip-
lomatic representation to African regional organizations is growing exponen-
tially. China has sharply increased its foreign aid and floated multibillion-dollar
loans, at low or no interest, to a variety of countries. It has aggressively promoted
cultural and educational exchanges involving Chinese universities and tens of
thousands of African students. It has also increased its military presence in Af-
rica, selling small arms and fighter aircraft to several nations, increasing its
number of military advisers, and building small-arms factories in Sudan and
other countries.
At the November 2006 China-Africa Economic Forum, hosted by Beijing and
attended by forty-eight African nations, President Hu promised that China
would double economic aid to the continent by 2009, increase trade and infra-
structure development, train fifteen thousand African professionals, provide
scholarships to four thousand African students, and develop increasingly closer
ties over the succeeding decade.7 This forum and China’s actions with respect to
Africa send a loud and clear message—that China has seized the initiative in Af-
rica, altering the continent’s strategic landscape.
China has used what it calls an “independent foreign policy” (a term by which
Beijing connotes independence from American power) to achieve its consider-
able influence in Africa, seeking diplomatic, military, and economic influence in
exchange for unconditional foreign aid, whatever the human rights record or
political practices of countries that benefit.8 However advantageous it is for
Beijing, this foreign policy undermines U.S. and international promotion of
good governance, market reform, and regional security and stability while con-
comitantly diminishing the influence of the United States and other countries in
Africa. China’s relationships with Angola and Zimbabwe, for instance, have
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enabled these countries to ignore international pressure and have frustrated ef-
forts to isolate, coerce, or reform them.
China’s strong influence in Africa and what it might portend for the inter-
national community is underscored by its relationship with Sudan. Sudan’s in-
ternal conflict has been roiling for decades. A seemingly intractable domestic
conflict with age-old roots has become a full-scale “ethnic cleansing.”9 The inter-
national community, collectively sworn not to allow another Rwanda-type mas-
sacre, is finding a solution elusive. Worsening the situation is China’s refusal to
yield to international pressure and condemn Sudanese actions, insisting on Sudan’s
right to govern its own internal affairs irrespective of the ongoing genocide. The
disturbing reality is that China is heavily invested in Sudan, whence 20 percent
of its African oil comes and where Chinese oil firms are deeply entrenched. Over
ten thousand Chinese workers live and work in the Sudan.10 Instead of using its
considerable influence in Sudan to work for a solution, Beijing has cast a blind eye
on Sudanese inaction and complicity—all but endorsing its actions. Chinese re-
fusal to address the situation appropriately is the primary reason for the watered-
down character of UN resolutions with respect to Sudan.11
Against this contextual background of China’s influence in Africa, let us now
explore Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in the continent. Af-
ter a short history of China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in gen-
eral, this article examines its perspectives on peacekeeping and its involvement
in peacekeeping missions in Africa (with particular focus, based on first-person
accounts, on the peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara). It closes with an
examination of the significance of Chinese contributions to peacekeeping in
Africa.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially joined the UN and became a
permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. Peacekeeping
missions have been authorized by the UN since 1948, but China initially chose
not to participate in them. China’s reluctance to contribute to UN peacekeeping
missions was primarily driven by its belief that the sovereignty of nations gave
them an inherent right to control their own internal affairs without third-party
interference—an issue that had been vital to the early survival of the PRC itself.12
In 1989, however, China began its first exploratory foray into UN peacekeeping
missions, sending nonmilitary observers to join the UN Namibia Transitional Pe-
riod Aid Group overseeing a general election. In 1990, China dispatched mili-
tary observers to the Middle East in support of the UN Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO). It was this act that marked the beginning of its official
participation in UN peacekeeping operations.13 Over the ensuing decade and a
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half, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) became increasingly involved with
peacekeeping, sending more than 6,500 peacekeepers to thirteen UN missions in
Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Geor-
gia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.14
Today, China sends more peacekeepers to more UN missions than any other
permanent member of the UNSC besides France—in fact, China was only re-
cently surpassed by France’s commitment of forces to Lebanon in August 2006.
As of January 2007, over 1,861 Chinese military and civilian personnel were de-
ployed to twelve UN missions; this number is expected to climb in the near fu-
ture as China sends additional peacekeepers into Lebanon and Sudan. In
comparison, France has 2,049 personnel in ten missions, the United Kingdom
360 in eight missions, the United States 316 in eight missions, and Russia 298 in
thirteen. Of the 114 nations now contributing 81,992 personnel to sixteen
peacekeeping missions worldwide, China ranks twelfth overall (France tenth,
the United Kingdom fortieth, the United States forty-third, and Russia
forty-fourth).15 In fairness to other UNSC permanent members, China’s dues
represent only 3 percent of the UN budget (the American share is 22 percent);
nonetheless, Beijing’s willingness to support UN peacekeeping missions with
personnel—a low-density/high-demand commodity—paints China as a “re-
sponsible stakeholder” on the international stage.16 China’s readiness as a per-
manent Security Council member to contribute large numbers of people also
lends important credibility to the very missions the council approves, funds, and
supports.
China, then, has certainly made up for a slow start in peacekeeping involve-
ment. It has contributed not only United Nations military observers (UNMOs)
but engineer battalions, police units, medical teams, and transportation compa-
nies as well. In fact, it has committed itself to providing permanently “one UN
standard engineering battalion, one UN standard medical team, and two UN
standard transportation companies to ongoing missions”—essentially estab-
lishing its own designated expeditionary niche.17
Chinese UNMOs are usually officers, selected or volunteering from a variety
of specialties and backgrounds.18 Staffs in the Beijing area are often drawn upon
for intelligence, logistics, infantry, and personnel officers to fill these positions.19
Tours normally last eight months to one year before units or personnel are re-
lieved and replaced by follow-on units or personnel.
The Chinese engineer battalions dedicated to UN missions normally deploy
as units, sometimes with reinforcement or augmentation. They frequently come
from the engineer brigade stationed at Nankou, Northwest Beijing, in the
Beijing Military Region. Other regions augment the engineer battalions as nec-
essary.20 The Nankou brigade, being in a constant state of training and
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preparedness for peacekeeping, with units either deployed or preparing to de-
ploy, and because of its familiarity with and repeated experience of such opera-
tions, has issued a UNMO handbook, Logistics Support for Peacekeeping Forces.21
Chinese civilian policemen are sent to the Chinese Peacekeeping Civil Police
Training Center, in Langfang, Hebei Province, fifty kilometers southeast of
Beijing, the largest such center in Asia. The training center is run by the People’s
Armed Police (PAP); however, there have been no PAP deployments as such in
support of peacekeeping operations.22 Prospective civilian police normally re-
ceive advanced peacekeeping training in thirty-one courses in the months be-
fore deploying. Training includes anti-riot procedures, searching techniques,
protection of very important persons, combat techniques, psychology skills,
physical agility, driving, and vehicle maintenance.23 Training is also conducted at
a base in Nanjing in Jiangsu Province.24 Chinese police units, medical teams, and
transportation companies deploying to UN peacekeeping missions are drawn
from various military regions. Units of these types have deployed to missions
alone and in combination.25
Since 2000, China has supported numerous missions on many different con-
tinents, sending UNMOs, police units, and troops to every clime and place. Of
note, in 2004 China sent a 125-man police company to Haiti—the first time a
complete Chinese police unit had been sent to a Western Hemisphere mission.
China has seven staff officers serving in the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations at the UN Headquarters in New York City. Nine Chinese peacekeepers
have died during UN missions to date. Chinese participation in UN peacekeep-
ing missions as of January 2007 is represented in the table.
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON UN PEACEKEEPING
China has clearly established itself as a credible UN peacekeeping contributor,
reversing an earlier policy of nonparticipation. What brought this sea change
about?
One of the main roots of the dramatic upswing in Chinese peacekeeping can
be traced to the PLA actions in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The events of
Tiananmen damaged ties that had developed between the PLA and the people of
China since the revolution in 1949. The People’s Liberation Army determined
that it needed to restore a congenial relationship with the broader society and
the world. The actions it chose included disaster relief, domestic security, and
other measures, but also, very importantly, participation in UN peacekeeping
operations.26
China’s attitudinal change with respect to UN peacekeeping was eventually
captured in a white paper, China’s National Defense in 2004. Chapter 9, “Inter-
national Security Cooperation,” in a section entitled “Participation in UN
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Peacekeeping Operations,” specifically lays out the new position on peace-
keeping missions:
China has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping oper-
ations that are consistent with the spirit of the UN Charter. It maintains that the UN
peacekeeping operations should abide by the purposes and principles of the UN
charter and other universally recognized principles governing peacekeeping opera-
tions. China will continue to support the reform of the UN peacekeeping missions,
hoping to strengthen further the UN capability in preserving peace.27
This section is unique among other permanent members’ national defense strat-
egies. No others specifically list involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and or
classify them under “theater security cooperation,” an important distinction.28
The importance that China now gives peacekeeping is emphasized as well in
China’s Foreign Affairs, an annual foreign-affairs compendium compiled by the
Policy Planning section of the Foreign Ministry to promulgate and explain the
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara)
14 military observers
MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
129 civilian police
MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DROC])
218 troops and 12 military observers (total 230)
UNIFIL (UN International Force in Lebanon)
392 troops
UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)
1 military observer
UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)
7 military observers
UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo)
18 military observers
UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia)
565 troops, 18 civilian police, 5 military observers (total 588)
UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan)
446 troops, 9 civilian police, 14 military observers (total 469)
UNMIT (UN Mission in Timor Leste [East Timor])
2 military observers
UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire)
7 military observers
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)
4 military observers
Total 1,861
CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
(as of January 2007)
Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, “Contributors.”
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government’s foreign policy and affairs. The document asserts that “UN peace-
keeping operations are an important means developed over many years of UN
practice for the maintenance of international peace and security”and that “always
valuing and supporting PKO [peacekeeping operations] consistent with the UN
Charter, China has gradually expanded its involvement in these endeavors and
thus projected an image of a peace-loving and responsible major country.”29
In support of this fundamental foreign policy change, the Chinese media has
portrayed PLA and civilian police participation in UN peacekeeping missions
positively. Further, the media devotes a great deal of attention to peacekeeping
troops, since they are the only forces deployed externally. These missions are an
opportunity to place China in a favorable light domestically and internationally,
which is important to the PLA and its role in society.30
Likewise, the populace follows the exploits of its peacekeepers closely. The
cremated ashes of a Chinese peacekeeper, Lieutenant Colonel Du Zhaoyu, who
died during an Israeli air raid on Lebanon in 2006, were interred at the
Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing. President Hu Jintao; the vice
chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Guo Boxiong; the
CMC’s vice chairman, Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan; Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing; and Liang Guanglie, chief of the General Staff of the PLA, all pre-
sented wreaths and paid personal respects. Du’s body was covered with the flag
of the Communist Party of China and surrounded by white roses and cypress
leaves. Hundreds of people, including Du’s colleagues, schoolmates, teachers,
and neighbors, attended the service.31 This story, like many other touching ones
like it, seems to have strengthened the bond between the people and the PLA.32
CHINA AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (1,316 personnel)
outweighs its total contributions elsewhere (545), a reflection of its keen interest
in peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Beijing has also stated to the UN that enhanc-
ing regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa in order to meet ongoing challenges
to security and stability is a Chinese priority.33
Furthermore, China’s African Policy, as defined by China’s African Policy: A
White Paper, specifically addresses a desire for “enhancing solidarity and co-
operation with African countries” as part of “an important component of
China’s independent foreign policy of peace,” promising that China will “continue
to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions
concerning peace and development in Africa.” China’s African Policy specifically
mentions UN peacekeeping as one of its security cooperation tools, as does the
defense white paper: China, it declares, “will urge the UN Security Council to
pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa” and “will continue
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its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa” as
part of “Enhancing All-Round Cooperation between China and Africa.”34
China is currently involved in all seven UN missions in Africa: in the Côte
d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), Sierra Leone
(UNIOSIL), and the Western Sahara (MINURSO, discussed at length below). The
Chinese have also been involved in past missions in Namibia in 1989–90
(UNTAG), Mozambique in 1993–94 (ONUMOZ), Liberia in 1993–97
(UNOMIL), Burundi in 2004 (ONUB), and both past Sierra Leone missions, in
1998–99 (UNOMSIL) and 1999–2005 (UNAMSIL).35
The seven Chinese UN military observers in the UNOCI mission (Côte
d’Ivoire) form part of a larger force comprising over 8,990 uniformed personnel.
UNOCI is charged with monitoring the cessation of hostilities and movements
of armed groups and with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repa-
triation, and resettlement of military personnel and militias.36
In MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DROC]), 230 Chinese
troops and UNMOs serve among 18,410 uniformed personnel deploying and
maintaining a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order “to pro-
mote the reestablishment of confidence; discourage violence, by deterring the
use of force to threaten the political process; and allow United Nations person-
nel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern part of DROC.”37 The Chinese
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have several times rotated (for eight-month tours) troops and UNMOs to this
mission, including engineer companies of 175 personnel and medical platoons
of forty personnel.38
In UNMEE (Eritrea and Ethiopia), seven Chinese UNMOs serve with 2,280
military personnel monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping ensure
observance of the security commitments agreed between the two countries.39
In UNMIL (Liberia), the Chinese contingent of 593 troops is part of a mis-
sion of 15,200 military personnel observing the implementation of a cease-fire
agreement, investigating violations and maintaining liaison among all Liberian
military forces.40 Past Chinese deployments to Liberia have been very successful.
For instance, the 1st PLA Construction Engineer Company from Shenyang Mili-
tary Region, a medical team from the Nanjing Military Region, and a transpor-
tation team from the General Logistics Department deployed in 2003–2004. The
construction company, actually a reserve water-supply unit, underwent a three-
month buildup and training period in preparation. These units built a 1,200-
kilometer road, four camps, two parking aprons, and twenty-one bridges, and
leveled off over seventy thousand square meters of ground. The medical team
treated over 2,300 outpatients, hospitalized over 250 people, and operated on
fifty. The transportation team moved over thirty thousand tons of material and
over seventy thousand people.41 Chinese peacekeepers are now in their fourth
tour to Liberia; in all, China has sent over 2,243 to that country.42
In UNMIS (Sudan), 469 Chinese serve as part of a mission of 9,980 support-
ing implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by warring
parties.43 Laiyang, in Shandong Province, sent a 275-man engineer detachment,
a hundred-person transportation detachment, and a sixty-man medical detach-
ment in 2005. Their principal missions were to construct roads, bridges, and air-
ports; provide water and power supplies; and transport personnel and water.44
There is a large Chinese presence in Sudan, and it is not uncommon to see signs
in Chinese along with Arabic and English.
In UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone), one Chinese UN military observer serves in a
278-person mission mandated to help the government of Sierra Leone consoli-
date peace, strengthen democracy, and sustain development.45
CHINESE PEACEKEEPERS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO)
The following commentary is based on the experiences of three American UN
military observers (including the author) who have served with Chinese peace-
keepers in the Western Sahara. The three were attached to MINURSO for six-
month deployments between 1998 and 2001.
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The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara
MINURSO was established by Security Council Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991,
in accordance with “the settlement proposals for la Liberación de Saguia el-
Hamra y de Río de Oro.” As agreed by the belligerents—Morocco and the Front
for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)—the im-
plementation plan provided for a transitional period during which a special rep-
resentative of the United Nations secretary-general would have sole and
exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum in which the
people of the Western Sahara would choose between independence and integra-
tion with Morocco. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by
an integrated group of UN civilian, military, and police personnel, to be known
as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara.46
The current military force is headed by a two-star general officer; as of Janu-
ary 2007 over twenty-five nations were represented. Fourteen Chinese UNMOs
serve in a contingent of 215 military personnel (twenty-eight troops, four po-
lice, 183 unarmed military observers), along with 101 international civilian per-
sonnel, 138 local civilian staff, and twenty-three United Nations volunteers to
the mission. The UNMOs are distributed among nine sites east and west of the
dividing line between the belligerents, a liaison office in Tindouf (Algeria), a
staging area in Dakhla, and the UN headquarters in Laayoune. The team sites’
areas of responsibility range in size from twelve thousand to forty-seven thou-
sand square kilometers. A team site’s UNMOs carry out an average of eighteen
patrols each week (some of them at night), each team site covering a minimum
of two thousand square kilometers. Approximately thirty-five UN helicopter re-
connaissance flights are conducted each month in the areas of responsibility.47
Since 1991, MINURSO has been effectively monitoring the cease-fire.
UNMOs patrol both sides of the dividing line and the demilitarized zone that
cuts across the Western Sahara, verifying compliance with military agreements
signed by both parties to the conflict. They monitor entry into the zone and such
activities as tactical reinforcement, redeployment of troops, infrastructure im-
provement, or other matters requiring prior approval. Military observers have
the right to visit the belligerents’ units and conduct patrols at any time.48
The Military South Sector Commander: The Chinese Colonel
The military mission in 2000 was co-led by the French and Chinese, who con-
tributed the largest numbers of UNMOs (twenty-one each). The operation is
split into North and South sectors for span-of-control purposes. The North Sec-
tor was led by a French colonel, who had approximately ninety-four UNMOs at
five team sites. The South Sector was led by a Chinese colonel in charge of the
same number of UNMOs and sites. These sector commanders had challenging
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jobs: they were personally responsible for all their UNMOs and operational con-
siderations in their sectors. Their responsibilities included all logistics, medical
care, aviation, and UN team sites and equipment, as well as the complaints and
infractions of the treaty parties. Threats to their forces included the possibility
of hostile acts by treaty parties, extreme weather (sandstorms, 150-degree heat,
etc.), and millions of mines laid during the Western Sahara conflict.49
The Southern Sector commander was based at Oum Dreyga (see map). The
Chinese colonel in 2000 was an extremely intelligent and capable officer who
spoke fluent English. He was very comfortable in his operational environment
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despite its challenges and handled all aspects of the mission smoothly. He was
very safety conscious, insisting especially upon driving safety—car accidents
were the number-one source of injuries and death for the mission.50
The Chinese UN Military Observers
The twenty-one Chinese peacekeepers in 2001 were capable, proficient, dedi-
cated, intelligent, and professional. Like any other country’s UNMOs, the indi-
vidual Chinese officers’ capabilities varied with personal experiences,
intelligence, personality, and communication skills.51
Operationally, the Chinese observers were sound. Most spoke English (the of-
ficial MINURSO language) well enough to accomplish the mission, though
some did so with only limited ability. A few were fluent not only in English but in
French, Russian, and other languages as well. Language facility was important
when it came time to assign billets and leadership positions; also, those who
spoke English well were assigned the rewarding jobs (e.g., team site commander,
deputy team site commander, operations officer, information officer). Chinese
UNMOs filled each of these positions at one team site or another. Of note, the
Chinese were sometimes used by sector commanders to pass information in
their own language over open radio nets so the belligerents would be unable to
intercept it; Spanish, French, Arabic, and Russian were in common use by the
Moroccans and the POLISARIO.52
The Chinese officers were tactically proficient, displaying a solid grasp of ex-
pected skills: navigation, information gathering, communication, and basic mil-
itary knowledge, among others. Again, these skills varied between individuals,
but most officers were technically capable. For instance, as the Smara team site
commander in the North Sector from July 2000 to January 2001, I appointed a
Chinese officer as my operations officer due to his UNMO skills. He was a very
sharp major from the logistics field who spoke English very well and had fine inter-
personal skills. When I left the mission he assumed command of the Smara team
site and by all accounts performed well.53
No particular “niche” capabilities or skills made the Chinese collectively
stand out from the rest of the MINURSO observers, but they did have one notice-
able and universal weakness—poor driving skills. China’s vehicle population at
that time was small; also, presumably, officers from the big cities would not have
needed to drive in China, and if they did, trained military drivers would usually
have been available. Whether for these or other reasons, however, the Chinese
officers were not car owners, by and large, and they had a particularly difficult
time (though they were not the only ones) handling the MINURSO four-by-
four, standard-transmission vehicles in desert conditions. The Chinese officers
had evidently been put through a quick course in driving and maintenance, but
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this did not replace a lifetime of driving experience. The driving conditions in
the Sahara were brutal, and the vehicles, although modified to meet the harsh
terrain, were not indestructible.54
As a matter of pride, the Chinese would not admit to their poor driving skills
but to a man resolutely tried to improve. Many took up the offer of additional
driving instruction from American UNMOs, and the latter were impressed with
their motivation. One U.S. officer successfully taught a Chinese UNMO the dif-
ficult mission of backing up the team’s pickup truck with the site trash trailer
hitched behind; the Chinese officer insisted on being the “permanent trash
driver” for the rest of the mission.55
Chinese Military Observer Personalities
As one would expect with any country, the personalities of the Chinese UNMOs
varied greatly. One American UNMO’s experiences with two Chinese officers (a
captain and a major) with whom he served in 1997 at a team site on the
POLISARIO side captures this observation. Both of the Chinese officers spoke
English well, and both were terrible drivers (though they thought the opposite).
Here their similarities ended. The captain, an infantry officer, was very ap-
proachable and genuinely liked by all team-site members. He had an outgoing
personality, a great sense of humor, a genuine interest in everyone at the site, and
was without question a team player. He was reliable, worked hard, and never
caused disputes.
The major was a bit different. He was not introverted or reserved, but neither
was he as amiable a character as the Chinese captain, and he befriended no one,
even the captain. He was very opinionated and did not mind prodding his fellow
UNMOs. According to the American observer, he deliberately antagonized the
Russians by insisting that communism was flourishing in China, that it had
failed in Russia, and that now Russia was failing with its new system as well. True
diplomats, the Russians wrote off the remarks, but they were convinced this offi-
cer was not a real major in the Chinese army. They were certain he was a political
agent, like a Soviet-era KGB rezident. They were quick to point out that the Chi-
nese captain not only never argued with the major but kept his distance from him.
In terms of reliability, punctuality, and work ethic, the major was everything
he should have been, but his personality was perhaps not well suited for a UN
mission. For instance, he once almost got the team site in serious trouble on pa-
trol by his tendency to pontificate on the merits of communism. On this occa-
sion he and two other UNMOs on patrol visited a POLISARIO logistical unit
commander and his small staff, all Muslims. Over tea and small talk, the major
started on communism and all its aspects; before long he was declaring that reli-
gion is just a manifestation of mankind’s collective imagination, manipulated by
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the capitalists and adhered to by only the less intelligent. This quickly drew
glares from the POLISARIO soldiers, who were astounded if not shocked. The
major, realizing his faux pas, abruptly ceased, and the UNMOs hastily concluded
the meeting.56
Specialty, Rank, Money, and Time Off
UNMOs, regardless of nationality, are led to believe that the UN military ob-
servers of other nations are intelligence officers expressly sent for intelligence
(or in UN parlance, information) collection. Whether this perception is true or
not is irrelevant; the belief is engrained in all UNMOs. In the end, everyone per-
ceives everyone else as an intelligence collector or intelligence officer.
The Chinese were naturally inquisitive and curious about Americans, and in
light of that perception it was difficult to tell if their questions were purely for
curiosity’s sake and thus benign or were truly aimed at developing profiles on
American (and other) officers. I believe the case was a little bit of both. The Chi-
nese questions sometimes ventured into technical and military realms, but cul-
tural and linguistic differences meant that it was never clear if they wanted us to
divulge secrets. In any case, there was not much strategic value to be gained from
U.S. military observers who categorically assumed the Chinese to be either polit-
ical or intelligence officers. However, the Chinese may very well have been what
they claimed to be—infantry, engineer, or logistics officers, or whatever special-
ties they professed.57
Another pervasive belief is that other countries’ militaries send senior officers
to UN missions but reduce them in rank for the mission, either to fill assigned
rank quotas or to allow senior officers to take part (there are only so many colo-
nel leadership billets in each mission). Although I met officers from other coun-
tries who admitted to voluntary demotions, it was not clear whether the Chinese
used this practice. Most American UNMOs assumed the Chinese were of higher
rank than advertised.58
All UN member states are legally obligated to pay their shares of peacekeeping
costs under an established formula. The top ten providers of assessed contribu-
tions to UN peacekeeping operations were (as of January 2006) the United
States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain,
China, and the Netherlands.59
Troops serving in UN peacekeeping operations are paid by their own govern-
ments, according to their own national ranks and salary scales. The UN offers
payments, at standard rates approved by the General Assembly, to compensate
for pay and allowances of all troops and as supplements for specialists (that
is, within infantry and logistics contingents and formed police units). In addi-
tion, contributing countries are reimbursed for the wear to clothing, gear and
8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:38 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc. du/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/7
equipment, and personal weaponry. The current rates per peacekeeper per
month are $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for special-
ists; $68 for personal clothing, gear, and equipment; and five dollars for personal
weaponry. Countries volunteering military contingents and formed police units
are reimbursed by the UN for transport to and from the mission and for wear
and tear to (and replacement if necessary of) “organic” equipment. Countries
are either reimbursed directly or arrangements are made to transport, equip, or
sustain their troops on a case-by-case basis.60
The Chinese UNMOs would each have received, tax free, eighty dollars (U.S.)
a day in cash, paid at the end of each month during the mission. This was the
same rate paid to all UNMOs in the mission. For a Chinese officer this repre-
sented a significant additional income.61
All UNMOs on UN missions work every day, with no time off. However, the
UN uses a “compensatory time off ” system to award days off for accumulated
workdays—that is, for every five days worked, the UNMO earns one day of com-
pensatory time off. Once an UNMO has accumulated approximately twelve days
off, he can, through prearrangement, schedule some “liberty” somewhere in the
MINURSO area of responsibility (Laayoune, Morocco, or the Canary Islands). It
was common for nationalities to schedule compensatory time off together in
one of these locations. The Chinese UNMOs had a favorite destination in Mo-
rocco, a town called Agadir. Evidently Agadir is home to a large Chinese fishing
community; eight to ten Chinese officers would head north to Agadir to enjoy a
week of Chinese food, fun, and fellowship.62
A Final Word on MINURSO
Perhaps the most endearing part of the mission for any officer in the Western Sa-
hara was the sharing with fellow UNMOs of national-day festivities, such as the
Fourth of July. Invariably this led to each nation’s taking its turn trying to out-
shine others with elaborately prepared national feasts, songs, and toasts. The pa-
triotic fervor of the Chinese was no less fierce than any American’s, and their
national day was a great event followed by a wonderful feast.
One year, when the team was gathered at the UN headquarters in Laayoune to
celebrate China’s national day, this patriotism was particularly evident. The Chi-
nese national contingent gathered to sing its national anthem and to raise its flag
in the headquarters square. As the national song played and all stood at atten-
tion, the flag was unfurled and duly hoisted—upside down. The nervous Chi-
nese officer who had unwittingly committed the error fainted in formation. His
fellow countrymen and others stifled smiles. One thing was made clear—all UN
military observers are the same, no matter what uniform they wear.63
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CHINESE PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: WHY DOES IT MATTER?
China’s recent rapid increase in UN peacekeeping missions and its willingness to
expand its participation in them speaks volumes to how it views their impor-
tance. The Chinese have performed well, and their strict discipline and high effi-
ciency have earned accolades, but what does China gain from this experience at
different levels?64
The Strategic Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
China’s recent UN peacekeeping track record reinforces its role as a responsible
stakeholder in the international community and gives it more global influence.
This influence is parlayed into prestige and clout, both of which are attractive in
the eyes of African countries, especially those inclined to search for alternatives
to partnerships of the kinds traditionally offered by Western nations. That
point, coupled with an overarching Chinese strategic approach to Africa that
features “an independent foreign policy,” $1.8 billion in African aid to date with
no apparent strings attached, and diplomatic, economic, and military ties with
90 percent of Africa (unshadowed by any colonial history on that continent),
make it unsurprising that it is quietly but steadily building a significant presence
there.65
The influence China gains from African nation support in international fora is
important to its “One China” policy; to its energy future, commerce, and military-
industrial complex; and to the advancement of its international agenda. This
mutually beneficial relationship is reinforced, in turn, by China’s participation
in UN peacekeeping missions—which it considers, as we have seen, a form of se-
curity cooperation. The more China advocates and participates in UN peace-
keeping missions, the more influence it creates with regional organizations (e.g.,
the African Union) formulating Africa’s future.
China has or is developing strong ties with the African nations to which it de-
ploys UN peacekeepers. This may be coincidental, but Beijing’s disproportion-
ately large contribution to African missions suggests otherwise. As
demonstrated, China has a vested interest in the strategic security and stability
of the African continent, and long-term involvement in peacekeeping missions
there should be expected.
The Operational Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
Having little power-projection capability and a policy not focused on overseas
deployment at the present time, for China UN peacekeeping operations repre-
sent one of the most important ways it can gain distant operational experience.
With these deployments, the Chinese gain exposure to the operational practices
and methods of foreign military forces as well. There are also benefits gained in
the areas of operational logistics, multinational operations, combat and civil
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engineering, and through a working knowledge of the operational environ-
ments in the deployment areas.
Moving a battalion or large echelon of personnel overseas, with all of the
predeployment training, support requirements, and logistics required, is not a
simple feat. Operating in a hostile or austere environment is also challenging,
and the preventive medicine and security measures necessary to safeguard the
force once there are not intuitively obvious. The value of being “on the ground”
in a foreign territory for an extended period cannot be easily duplicated, and such
experiences are more useful and practical than any other foreign-area training
imaginable. Unit cohesion is also an immediate benefit. The fact that Chinese
units are redeploying multiple times to Africa means that a ready force of African
operational experts is being built—something the United States does not have.
This last point is very important. PRC troop deployments in support of UN
missions such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and the Sudan are giving Beijing an advantage in operationally deploying
to these vastly different and difficult countries. This advantage comprises in-
valuable knowledge about logistics, ports of debarkation, lines of communica-
tion, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local “atmospherics” and
modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged
periods.
Chinese UN military observers who command at any level of UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa (such as the MINURSO colonel we have described) are
privy to a unique operational opportunity available to few other non-African of-
ficers in the world. This alone is an invaluable operational commodity derived
from UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.
The Tactical Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
Chinese peacekeepers who serve in Africa on UN missions also enjoy a unique
opportunity as well: nothing can replace “boots on the ground” knowledge
learned in such missions. Any MINURSO UNMO who has navigated with GPS
across thousands of kilometers of desert, talked to local Bedouin, and survived
the harsh Sahara and the extremes of desert weather will have a decided advan-
tage in such operational environments, whether in Africa or elsewhere, UN re-
lated or not.
Repeated deployments to UN missions in Africa by China will enable the PLA
to build an extensive knowledge base. The Chinese major who succeeded me as
the Smara team site commander returned to Africa in 2006 for another one-year
deployment, this time to Sudan, as a colonel. As far as African expertise goes, he
has likely already twice the knowledge base that I possess in all things pertaining
to African operational missions.
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Now multiply that advantage by the one thousand personnel whom China is
rotating through missions every year in support of UN peacekeeping in Africa.
This effort is outpacing Washington’s efforts dedicated to operations in Africa
by a considerable margin.66 Conceivably, the United States will one day turn to
the Chinese military for help and expertise in missions in Africa.
One unintended consequence of China’s substantial participation in UN mis-
sions relates to Beijing’s stance on sovereignty, as regards intervention in foreign
states. It appears that China is slowly being conditioned by the humanitarian ef-
forts in which it has been participating. Whereas China once might have seen
UN intervention as a potential threat to its own internal affairs, it now sees the
intrinsic value of UN efforts in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building
and perhaps appreciates more than it once did how interventions can promote
regional stability and security.67
If so, this means China will continue to support UN peacekeeping efforts
globally for the foreseeable future, which would be important to all members of
the international community. China’s willingness to send significant numbers
of personnel eases the strain on others, and its position as a permanent member
of the United Nations Security Council lends a valuable impetus to peacekeeping
in general.
Thus China will continue to send UN peacekeepers worldwide, but it will do
so specifically with a keen eye to regions that correspond to its strategic vision.
Beijing will continue to view peacekeeping as a valuable security cooperation
tool in Africa, and it will take every opportunity to contribute to missions on the
continent due to the strategic, operational, and tactical benefit and influence it
gains from them. The United States needs to comprehend Beijing’s multifaceted
and increasingly significant presence in Africa, take account of its contributions
to UN peacekeeping operations, and grasp the positive and negative ramifica-
tions of this Chinese engagement.
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